Shareholder Power and Corporate Governance

Dennis Leech

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: The pattern of ownership and control of British industry is unusual compared with most other countries in that ownership is relatively dispersed. Typically the largest shareholder in any large listed company is likely to own a voting minority of the shares. Majority ownership by a single shareholder is unusual. It is not uncommon for the largest shareholding to be under 20 percent and in many cases it is much less than that. A broadly similar pattern is observed in the USA. Two inferences about corporate governance are conventionally drawn from this, following the early work of Berle and Means: (1) All but the very largest shareholders are typically too small to have any real incentive to participate in decision making; (2) All but the very largest shareholdings are too small to have any real voting power. The question of voting power is the focus of this paper.

Keywords: OWNERSHIP; SHAREHOLDERS; VOTING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2000
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:564

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