The Assignment of Powers in Federal and Unitary States

Ben Lockwood

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a model where the power to set policy (a choice of project) may be assigned to central or regional government via either a federal or unitary referendum (constitutional rule, CR). The benefit of central provision is an economy of scale, while the cost is political inefficiency. The relationship between federal and unitary CRs is characterized in the asymptotic case as the number of regions becomes large, under the assumption that the median project benefit in any region is a random draw from a fixed distribution, G.

Keywords: DECENTRALIZATION; GOVERNMENT; REFERENDUM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp569.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: THE ASSIGNMENT OF POWERS IN FEDERAL AND UNITARY STATES (2000)
Working Paper: The Assignment of Powers in Federal and Unitary States (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:569

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