Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies?

Paola Conconi

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we employ a common agency model to study the role of green and producer lobbies in the determination of trade and environmental policies. We focus on two large countries that are linked by trade flows and transboundary pollution externalities. We show that the nature of the relationship between lobbies and the relative efficiency of unilateral and cooperative policy outcomes depend crucially on three factors: the type of policy regime, whether governments act unilaterally or cooperatively, and the extend of the 'pollution leakages'.

Keywords: POLLUTION; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 Q20 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp570.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Green and producer lobbies: enemies or allies? (2002)
Working Paper: Green and Producer Lobbies: Enemies or Allies (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:570

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().