Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents?

E. le Borgne and Ben Lockwood

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holders and the electorate, where the office-holder is initially uninformed about herability (following Holmström, 1999). If office-holder effort and ability interact in the "production function" that determines performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to experiment, i.e. raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability.

Keywords: ELECTIONS; BUSINESS CYCLES; PRODUCTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H41 J44 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:580

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