Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund

Dennis Leech

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: In general in an organization whose system of governance involves weighted voting, a member's weight in terms of the number of votes and the formal power it represents differ. Power indices provide a means of analyzing this difference. The paper uses new algorithms for computing power indices for large games.

Keywords: VOTING; GAMES; SHAREHOLDERS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:583

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