Axiomatization of Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies

A. van den Nouweland and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using consistency properties, we characterize the cost-sharing scheme arising from the ratio equilibrium concept for economies with public goods. The characterization turns out to be surprisingly simple and direct. In contrast to most axiomatic characterizations based on reduced games and consistency properties, our characterization requires that in the reduced game, the players take as given the proportions of the costs paid by the members of the complementary player set, rather than their utility levels.

Keywords: COSTS; PUBLIC GOODS; GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H40 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp585.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies (2002)
Working Paper: Axiomatizations of ratio equilibria in public good economies (2002)
Working Paper: Axiomatization of ratio equilibria in public good economies (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:585

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().