Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Frank Page and Paulo Monteiro

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In particular, we show that given any profile of incentive compatible indirect contracting mechanisms, there exists an incentive compatible direct contracting mechanism which in all circumstances generates the same contract selection as the profile of indirect mechanisms. Second, we establish a competitive taxation principle.

Keywords: INFORMATION; GAMES; TAXATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 E31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing (2003)
Working Paper: Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (2002)
Working Paper: Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing (2002)
Working Paper: Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing (2002)
Journal Article: Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:592

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