CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

J. Robert Branston, Keith Cowling and Roger Sugden
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J. Robert Branston: Universities of Birmingham, Ferrara and Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Keith Cowling: Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Roger Sugden: Universities of Birmingham, Ferrara and Wisconsin-Milwaukee

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: A theory of the firm based on strategic decision-making highlights governance as a central issue. Preferences vary over strategy but not all interests are currently being represented, resulting in a failure to govern in the public interest. As solutions, we consider the design of company law and also more immediate ways forward, focusing on regulation and democratically controlled public agencies, but stressing the fundamental significance of active, effective citizens. Throughout, the arguments are illustrated using examples from various countries and industries, including education, information technology, football and public utilities in Europe and the US.

Keywords: Governance; Strategic Decisions; Public Interest; Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G38 H11 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:626

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