INFORMATION AND COMMAND

Mark Harrison ()

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Information adds value to transactions in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customisation, and provides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information was frequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whether concealed or not, it was often of poor quality. In short, the Soviet command system forced economic growth on the basis of a relatively low–value information stock. This may help explain aspects of Soviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse of the command system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Information and Command (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:635

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