SOCIAL CONFORMITY AND EQUILIBRIUM IN PURE STRATEGIES IN GAMES WITH MANY PLAYERS

Myrna Wooders, Edward Cartwright and Reinhard Selten

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to construct an e-equilibrium in pure strategies, an ‘e-purification’ result. Our main result is a social conformity theorem. Interpret a set of players, all with attributes in some convex subset of attribute space and all playing the same strategy, as a society. Observe that the number of societies may be as large as the number of players. Our social conformity result dictates that, given e > 0, there is an integer L, depending on e but not on the number of players, such that any sufficiently large game has an e-equilibrium in pure strategies that induces a partition of the player set into fewer than L societies.

Pages: 59 pages
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp636.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Social Conformity and Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:636

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().