CANDIDATE STABILITY AND PROBABILISTIC VOTING PROCEDURES

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez (carmelor@ccee.ucm.es)

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We extend the analysis of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (Econometrica 2001) on strategic candidacy to probabilistic environments. For each configuration of the agenda and each profile of voters' preferences over running candidates a probabilistic voting procudure selects a lottery on the set of candidates at stake. Assuming that candidates cannot vote, we show that random dictatorships are the only unanimous probabilistic voting procedures that never provide unilateral incentives for the candidates to leave the ballot independently of the composition of the agenda. However, more flexible rules can be divised if we focus on the stability of specific agendas.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp667.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Candidate stability and probabilistic voting procedures (2006)
Working Paper: Candidate Stability and Probabilistic Voting Procedures (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:667

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