On Equilibrium in Pure Stategies in Games with Many Players

Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a framework of noncooperative games, allowing both countable sets of pure strategies and player types, in which players are characterized by their attributes and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be used to construct a Nash "-equilibrium in pure strategies that is ‘"-equivalent’. Our framework introduces and exploits a distinction between crowding attributes of players (their external effects on others) and their taste attributes (their payoff functions). The set of crowding attributes is assumed to be compact; this is not required, however, for taste attributes. For the special case of at most a finite number of crowding attributes, we obtain analogs, for finite games, of purification results due to Pascoa (1993a,b,1998) for games with a continuum of players. Our main theorems are based on a new mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley-Folkman Theorem but applicable to a countable (not necessarily finite dimensional) strategy space.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2003
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Related works:
Journal Article: On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players (2009)
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2005)
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2003)
Working Paper: On Equilibrium in Pure Strategies in Games with Many Players (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:686

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