DO ELECTIONS ALWAYS NOTIVATE INCUMBENTS? LEARNING VS CAREER CONCERNS

Eric Le Borgne and Ben Lockwood
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Eric Le Borgne: IMF

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between officeholder and the electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the officeholder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn i.e. raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “career concerns” effect of elections on effort. Moreover, when this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.

Keywords: Career Concerns; Elections; Citizen-Candidate; Learning; Effort; Incomplete Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H41 J44 J45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp714.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Career Concerns (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:714

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