Correlated equilibrium and behavioural conformity
Edward Cartwright and
Myrna Wooders
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make his action choice conditional on his role. Our main result demonstrates that ‘near to’ any correlated equilibrium is an approximate correlated equilibrium ‘with conformity’ — that is, an equilibrium where all ‘similar players’ play the same strategy, have the same probability of being allocated to each role, and receive approximately the same payoff; in short, similar players ‘behave in an identical way’ and are treated nearly equally. To measure ‘similarity’ amongst players we introduce the notions of approximate substitutes and a (d, Q)-class games — a game with Q classes of players where all players in the same class are d-substitutes for each other.
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... s/2008/twerp_732.pdf
Related works:
Working Paper: Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity (2005) 
Working Paper: Correlated equilibrium and behavioral conformity (2004) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:732
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