Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict

Sayantan Ghosal and Eugenio Proto

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies the conditions under which intra-elite conflict leads to a democracy. There are two risk averse elites competing for the appropriation of a unit of social surplus, with an ex-ante uncertainty about their future relative bargaining power, and a large non-elite class unable to act collectively. We characterize a democracy as consistng of both franchise extension to, and lowering the cost of collective political activity for, individuals in the non-elite. In the absence of democracy, the stronger elite is always able to appropriate the entire surplus. We show that in a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize and always prefer to form a coalition with weaker elite against the stronger resulting in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. Accordingly, the elites choose to democratize if they are sufficiently risk averse. Our formal analysis can account for stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.

Keywords: Democracy, conflict; collective action; coalition formation; party formation; bargaining; risk-sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H11 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict (2009)
Working Paper: Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-elite Conflict (2008)
Working Paper: Democracy, Collective Action and Intra-Elite Conflict (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:844

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