P-Stable Equilibrium: Definition and Some Properties

Gabriel Desgranges and Sayantan Ghosal

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We define a continuous index of strategic stability,p.stability, which requires equilibrium to be the unique outcome compatible with common knowledge of rationality and common knowledge of p.beliefs (beliefs that put probability at least p on the equilibrium profile). We show that every equilibrium (within a large class) is p-stable for some p

Keywords: common knowledge; strategic uncertainty; rationalizability. JEL Classification: C70; D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: P-STABLE EQUILIBRIUM: DEFINITION AND SOME PROPERTIES (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:952

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