Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England

Ben Lockwood and Francesco Porcelli

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies Comprehensive Performance Assessment, an explicit incentive scheme for local government in England. Motivated by a simple theoretical political agency model, we predict that CPA should increase service quality and local taxation, but have an ambiguous e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of service provision. We test these predictions using a difference in difference approach, using Welsh local authorities as a control group, exploiting the fact that local authorities in Wales were not subject to the same CPA regime. To do this, we construct original indices of service quality and e¢ ciency, using Best Value Performance Indicators. We estimate that CPA increased the effective band D council tax rate in England relative to Wales by 4%, and increased our index of service quality output also by about 4%, but had no signifcant effect on our efficiency indices. There is evidence of heterogenous effects of CPA on efficiency, with some evidence that CPA impacted more on less efficient councils, and the "harder test" from 2005-8 having a much bigger effect. Key words: local government ; incentives ; efficiency ; difference in difference ; DEA JEL classification: H10 ; H70 ; H77 ; C21

Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England (2013)
Working Paper: Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England (2011)
Working Paper: Incentive Schemes for Local Government: Theory and Evidence from Comprehensive Performance Assessment in England (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:960

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