Crowd Learning without Herding: A Mechanism Design Approach

Jacob Glazer (), Ilan Kremer and Motty Perry
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Ilan Kremer: Department of Economics, University of Warwick and Faculty of Management and Economics Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: Crowdfunding, Internet websites, and health care are only a few examples of markets in which agents make decisions not only on the basis of their own investigations and knowledge, but also on the basis of information from a "central planner" about other agents’ actions. While such reciprocal learning can be welfare-improving, it may reduce agents’ incentives to conduct their own investigations, and may lead to harmful cascades. We study the planner’s optimal policy regarding when to provide information and how much information to provide. We show that the optimum policy involves a delicate balance of hiding and revealing information.

Keywords: Informationio Cascades; Mechanism Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... _design_approach.pdf

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Working Paper: Crowd Learning without Herding: A Mechanism Design Approach (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:10

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