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Information Acquisition and Use by Networked Players

David Myatt and Chris Wallace

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: In an asymmetric coordination (or anti-coordination) game, players acquire and use signals about a payoff-relevant fundamental from multiple costly information sources. Some sources have greater clarity than others, and generate signals that are more correlated and so more public. Players wish to take actions close to the fundamental but also close to (or far away from) others’ actions. This paper studies how asymmetries in the game, represented as the weights that link players to neighbours on a network, affect how they use and acquire information. Relatively centrally located players (in the sense of Bonacich, when applied to the dependence of players’ payoffs upon the actions of others) acquire fewer signals from relatively clear information sources; they acquire less information in total; and they place more emphasis on relatively public signals

Keywords: Networks; Bonacich Centrality; Information Acquisition and Use; Public and Private Information JEL classification numbers: C72; D83; D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017
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Journal Article: Information acquisition and use by networked players (2019) Downloads
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