When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness

David Ronayne and Daniel Sgroi

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: We present results from an experiment involving 1,500 participants on whether, when and why good advice is ignored, focusing on envy and stubbornness. Participants performance in skill-based and luck-based tasks generated a probability of winning a bonus. About a quarter ignored advice that would have increased their chance of winning. Good advice was followed less often when the adviser was relatively highly remunerated or the task was skill-based. More envious advisees took good advice more often in the skill-based task, but higher adviser remuneration significantly reduced this effect. Susceptibility to the sunk cost fallacy reduced the uptake of good advice.

Keywords: advice, skill; remuneration; envy; sunk cost fallacy JEL classification numbers: C91; C99; D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... 38_-_creta_sgroi.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
Working Paper: When Good Advice is Ignored: The Role of Envy and Stubbornness (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:38

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