Designing Communication Hierarchies

Dimitri Migrow

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: A manager aims to elicit employees’ information by designing a hierarchical communication network. She decides who communicates with whom, and in which order, where communication takes the form of “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) and the information structure is beta-binomial. The optimal network is shaped by two competing forces: an intermediation force that calls for grouping employees together and an uncertainty force that favours separating them. The manager optimally divides employees into groups of similar bias. Under simple conditions on biases and a uniform prior, the optimal network features a single intermediary who communicates directly to the manager JEL classification numbers: C72 ;D82 ; D83

Keywords: organizational design; strategic communication; informationaggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... -_dimitri_migrow.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:44

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().