Surplus Bounds in Cournot Monopoly and Competition
Daniele Condorelli and
Additional contact information
Daniele Condorelli: University of Warwick
Balazs Szentes: London School of Economics
CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA
We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical ﬁrms with constant marginal cost compete a’ la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we ﬁrst identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer and producer surplus that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we ﬁx the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., ﬁrst best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, producer surplus and deadweight loss.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... ielle_condorelli.pdf
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:62
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().