A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games

Manipushpak Mitra, Indrajit Ray () and Souvik Roy
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Souvik Roy: Applied Statistics Unit, Indian Statistical Institute

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: For a strategic market game (as introduced by Shapley and Shubik), following Dubey and Rogawski (1990), we provide a full explicit characterisation of the set of trading equilibria (in which all goods are traded at a positive price), for both the “buy and sell†and the “buy or sell†versions of this model under standard assumptions on the utility functions. We interpret and illustrate our equilibrium-characterising conditions; we also provide simple examples of trading equilibria, including those of non-interior strategy profiles (in which at least one trader is using the whole endowment in at least one good or money).

Keywords: strategic market game; trading equilibrium; interior profile; buy and sell; buy or sell JEL codes: C72; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-inv, nep-mic, nep-mst and nep-upt
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