The Effects of Social Capital on Government Performance and Turnover: Theory and Evidence from Italian Municipalities
Emanuele Bracco (),
Michela Redoano and
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Federica Liberini: University of Bath
Ben Lockwood: University of Warwick
Francesco Porcelli: ESRC CAGE Centre & Universita di Bari
Michela Redoano: University of Warwick
QAPEC Discussion Papers from Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre
This paper makes three contributions. First, it presents a theoretical analysis of how social capital, formalized as trust in politicians, impacts on government performance and turnover, employing a political agency model with both moral hazard and adverse selection. Second, it presents novel measures of both local government performance and on social capital at the Italian municipality level, using administrative data and an online survey respectively. Third, empirical results are consistent with the main predictions of the theory; higher social capital improves both the discipline and selection effects of elections (performance both in the first and final terms in office), but also increases turnover of incumbent mayors.
Keywords: Social Capital; Voting; Elections; Government Efficiency JEL Classification: H41; H72; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wqapec:04
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