In the Grip of Whitehall? The Effects of Party Control on Local Fiscal Policy in the UK

Ben Lockwood, Francesco Porcelli and James Rockey
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Ben Lockwood: University of Warwick

QAPEC Discussion Papers from Quantitative and Analytical Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: This paper uses an instrumental variable approach based on close elections to evaluate the effect of political parties on local fiscal policy in England and Wales over the period 1998-2016. Our main finding is that political control of the council (by Labour, Conservative or Liberal Democrat parties) has no effect on total expenditure, the composition of expenditure, the property tax rate (council tax per band D property) or total council tax revenue. Thus, our results confirm the widely expressed belief that centrally imposed constraints on local government fiscal policy (rate-capping, and more recently, compulsory referenda) hold local government fiscal policy in a tight grip.

Keywords: Party Control; Grants; Government Spending; Taxation JEL Classification: H70; H71; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-mac and nep-ure
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... -_qapec_lockwood.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: In the Grip of Whitehall? The Effects of Party Control on Local Fiscal Policy in the UK (2022)
Working Paper: In the Grip of Whitehall? The Effects of Party Control on Local Fiscal Policy in the UK (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wqapec:13

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