Dynamic Personalized Pricing with Active Consumers
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Xiaolei Wang: Monash University
Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers from Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers
We study a two-period duopoly model where firms gather consumer data from first period customers then use them for second-period personalized pricing, with a focus on active consumers who can bypass price discrimination with identity management (IM). As a result, IM weakens competition and allows firms to adopt perfect price discrimination which gives massive profit for firms in the personalized-pricing stage. Anticipating this, firms engage in below-cost pricing in the first stage to compete for consumer data. This strategy is similar to predatory pricing not only because of below-cost pricing but firms can also recoup losses later, however, we show that in this case below-cost pricing is driven by competition and beneficial to consumers.
Keywords: Personalized pricing; behavior-based price discrimination; identity management JEL Classification: D43; L13; L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cwa and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:08
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