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Exchange Asymmetry and Charitable Objects

Anthony Luxford
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Anthony Luxford: Monash University

Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers from Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers

Abstract: This paper presents results from an online experiment to show whether exchange asymmetry exists with charitable objects; a novelty good not yet used in past experiments. The rationale of this novelty was to excavate the notion of ownership of the goods by reason that charitable objects cannot be kept. These experimental results show exchange asymmetry exists in this novel context, implicating that ownership of the object was not necessary for exchange asymmetry to occur. This supports literature which posits that experimental protocols underpin observed exchange asymmetries in laboratory experiments. This research, therefore, further demarcates a distinguishing line between (1) the increased valuation of an object due to idiosyncratic associations through its ownership over time and (2) an immediately instantiated sense of ownership proclaimed to be the same effect manifesting in laboratory experiments.

Keywords: Exchange asymmetry; Charitable objects; Endowment effect JEL Classification: C91; D81; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:34

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