Why Do Men Keep Swiping Right? Two-Sided Search in Swipe-Based Dating Platforms

Patricio Hernandez Senosiain
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Patricio Hernandez Senosiain: University of Warwick

Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers from Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers

Abstract: In today’s love market, swipe-based dating platforms (SBDPs) such as Tinder or Bumble have a well-established presence, but novel platform features can add significant complexities to the user’s search problem in ways that have been largely under-studied in previous literature. This paper formulates a model of two-sided search within SBDPs, where agents with heterogeneous preferences seek multipleromantic partners whilst facing intertemporal action constraints. Using numerical methods, I approximate stationary equilibria and perform comparative statics onvarious exogenous parameters that help explain stylised empirical facts. Finally, agent-based simulations are used to asses the structure of stationary equilibria as well as its attainability under myopic best-response dynamics.

Keywords: Optimal Search; Two Sided Matching; Agent-Based Modeling JEL Classification: C78; D83; C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp and nep-pay
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:37

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