Miss Congeniality in Crisis: a theoretical model of gender, cooperation and leadership

Jeanne Yi-Ern Cheong
Additional contact information
Jeanne Yi-Ern Cheong: Monash University

Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers from Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers

Abstract: Why do female leaders do better in crisis situations than their male counterparts as a stylised fact? We integrate intrinsic preference into a Leader – Expert coordination game to model the impact of dominant strategies on the effectiveness of crisis management outcomes. We show that given the Leader has intrinsic preference for cooperative (competitive) behaviour, the Expert will reciprocate in kind which results in the highest (lowest) social outcome. Using cultural transmission theory to develop the theoretical micro-foundation of this preference, we find socialisation inefficiencies arising from two-parent socialisation result in the persistence of cooperative traits in women and competitive traits in men, thereby providing a mechanism for more effective crisis management by female leaders. Drawing upon feminist and leadership theory to inform our assumptions, we suggest that collective ability to deal with crisis will be improved if male leaders are more cooperative.

Keywords: gender; crisis management; cultural transmission; leadership JEL Classification: J16; B52; B54; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hme and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... ne_yi-ern_cheong.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:38

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Warwick-Monash Economics Student Papers from Warwick Monash Economics Student Papers Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().