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Vulnerability and Bargaining Power in EU-Russia Gas Relations

Edward Hunter Christie, Pavel K. Baev and Volodymyr Golovko

No III-003, FIW Research Reports series from FIW

Abstract: This report contains three separate papers, each addressing selected issues concerning natural gas policy and security of gas supply in Europe. The over-arching themes are vulnerability (to supply disruptions, to supplier pricing power) and fragmentation; and measures designed to overcome them, namely interconnection and consolidation of bargaining power. The first paper contains a review of some of the economic effects of, and subsequent policy reactions to, the January 2009 cut of Russian gas supplies through the Ukraine Corridor, with a particular focus on Bulgaria and on EU policy. The second paper provides an analysis of the current state of gas relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, with a focus on the Ukrainian perspective and on recent political developments in that country. The third paper provides an analysis of the case for consolidating buyer power in line with the concept of an EU Gas Purchasing Agency.

Keywords: European Union; Natural gas; security of supply; supply disruption; internconnector; Russia; Ukraine; Bulgaria; energy policy; fragmentation; bargaining power; countervailing power; gas purchasing agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L11 Q34 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71
Date: 2011-03
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