Environmental Protection Agencies: Measuring the Welfare Benefits from Regulation under Different Information Contexts
Ana Espinola-Arredondo () and
Felix Munoz-Garcia ()
No 2011-11, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
This paper evaluates the welfare benefits of introducing environmental regulation in a market that is subject to the threat of entry. We consider complete and incomplete information settings, where potential entrants use the regulator’s tax policy and the incumbent’s output decisions in order to infer the incumbent’s cost structure. When the regulator is absent, we show that firms? entry-deterring practices increase pollution relative to complete information. Hence, under certain conditions, environmental regulation becomes more beneficial in incomplete than in complete information contexts. Our results, therefore, identify under which cases an under-or over-estimation of the welfare benefits of environmental regulation arises from ignoring the information setting in which firms interact. We also examine how this estimation error increases as firms become more symmetric in their production costs.
Keywords: Entry deterrence; Signaling; Emission fees; Welfare Benefits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H23 L12 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-env and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/AnaEspinola/WP2011-12.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-11
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Danielle Engelhardt ().