The Impact of Environmental Taxes on Firms' Technology and Entry Decisions
Boying Liu () and
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Ana Espinola-Arredondo: School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
No 2013-2, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
This paper investigates under which conditions a regulator can strate- gically set an emission fee as a tool to induce a domestic firm to adopt a non-polluting technology and deter entry. We consider a market in which a monopolistic incumbent faces the threat of entry from firms that can choose between a dirty and a green technology. Our results show that, despite the fact of facing a polluting incumbent, an entrant might find it profitable to acquire a clean technology if the environmental tax is strin- gent enough. In addition, we demonstrate that an incumbent that adopts a clean technology is more likely to deter entry than an incumbent that keeps its dirty technology. Finally, we also show that a non-polluting duopoly market, in which all firms acquire clean technology, is socially preferred to a non-polluting monopoly market if the green technology cost is sufficiently low. However, if the clean technology becomes more expensive it may be socially optimal to have a polluting duopoly market in which only one firm adopts the green technology.
Keywords: Technology Adoption; Market Structure; Emission Tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H23 L12 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-reg
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http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/AnaEspinola/WP2013-2.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsu:wpaper:espinola-14
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