Strategic Interaction and Institutional Quality Determinants of Environmental Regulations across Select OECD Countries
Gregmar Galinato () and
Hayley Chouinard ()
No 2014-7, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University
We provide a model of environmental regulation to control transboundary pollution while considering the role of neighboring country regulations and measures of the quality of own and neighboring country government institutions. We apply a Spatial Durbin model to identify the determinants of the environmental regulations of several OECD countries. We do not find evidence of strategic interaction as the regulations of a neighbor do not significantly impact the own country regulations. However, the higher the quality of government institutions in a country, the more stringent the implementation of regulations. Additionally, government institutional quality significantly positively impacts the stringency of regulations in neighboring countries indirectly, possibly through technology choices.
Keywords: Environmental regulations; institutions; spatial model; strategic interaction; spillovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-reg and nep-res
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http://faculty.ses.wsu.edu/WorkingPapers/Galinato/WP2014-7.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wsu:wpaper:galinato-12
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