Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal

Hayley Chouinard () and Jonathan Yoder ()

No 2006-7, Working Papers from School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University

Abstract: This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders’ value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners’ values are publicized, agents retain the value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agents’ contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full expected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this context.

Keywords: repeated auction; right of first refusal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2006-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal (2007)
Working Paper: Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal (2007)
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