The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization
Papers from World Trade Institute
Drawing on the literature on effectiveness, this paper studies how the European Union chooses judges to serve on the World Trade Organizations’ key judicial institution: the Appellate Body. Conceptually, the paper differentiates between effectiveness in representation and effectiveness in impact. The paper shows how delegation to the European Commission has increased the strategic agenda-setting power for championing its preferred candidates. The paper further compares European and US practice in nominating candidates. Overall, the paper finds that effectiveness in representation has increased. In terms of effectiveness in impact, the paper shows how the international environment conditions EU influence. The paper also exhibits the difficulties to study effectiveness of EU external relations due to the peculiar decision-making processes dominant in judicial bodies.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.wti.org/media/filer_public/4c/89/4c89a4 ... kingpaperelsig28.doc First version (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wti:papers:556
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from World Trade Institute Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Morven McLean ().