Has the War between the Rent Seekers Escalated?

Russell Sobel and Joshua Hall

No 14-33, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University

Abstract: Vedder and Gallaway (1991) develop and test a unique theory about the interactions between the levels of spending captured by rent-seeking interest groups. They hypothesize that initially rent seekers cooperate in ways that expand government spending and rents. At some point, however, groups can only expand their rents at the expense of other rent-seekers and that this relationship will strengthen over time. In this brief note, we update their empirical model 20 years into the future and find their prediction was accurate. The relationship is now stronger and more states have moved into the negative range.

Keywords: rent-seeking; special interest groups; teacher salaries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2014-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent ... =econ_working-papers (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: Has the War between the Rent Seekers Escalated? (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wvu:wpaper:14-33

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Feng Yao ().