Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Receivers

Yun Wang

No 2015-03-24, Working Papers from Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of persuasion mechanisms in collective decision-making. A biased sender adopts a Bayesian persuasion mechanism to provide a committee of uninformed receivers with signals about the unknown state of the world. We compare public persuasion with private persuasion. We find that the sender can always reach the concave closure of the set of possible expected payoffs under public persuasion, regardless of the number of generated signals. The sender is weakly worse off under private persuasion. We also provide conditions under which the receivers' welfare from private persuasion dominates that from public persuasion. Moreover, voting fully aggregates receivers' private information in the state where the sender and receivers' preferences are perfectly aligned, while full information aggregation may fail in other states.

Keywords: strategic information transmission; sender-receiver game; Bayesian persuasion; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2015-03-24
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wyi:wpaper:002253

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