A Multi-Stage Market Game that Implements any Walrasian Allocation in any Pure-Exchange Environment
Mouhua Liao ()
No 2019-07-03, Working Papers from Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE), Xiamen University
This paper studies retrading in a multi-stage Shapley--Shubik structure market game with symmetric limit orders and a finite number of agents. Without restrictions on preferences and endowments, a constructive proof is used to show that any Walrasian allocation can be implemented by a Markov perfect equilibrium if agents are allowed to retrade for a finite number of rounds before they consume. As part of the proof, we give a closed form expression for the required number of rounds, which depends on the Walrasian allocation and the selection of a numeraire.
Keywords: Market game; Retrading; Symmetric limit orders; Walrasian equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D40 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wyi:wpaper:002432
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