Strategic interactions in corporate tax between Chinese local governments

Yang Chen and Paulo Regis

No 2014-01, RIEI Working Papers from Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Research Institute for Economic Integration

Abstract: Within the time framework of this study (1998-2012), the institutional settings of intergovernmental relations may constrain any strategic behavior of local governments since provincial tax rates are set by the central government. However, attracting business is an important measure of public officials?performance. Government officials have created alternative channels for tax competition. Our findings are consistent with this view that competition in corporate tax is relevant between provinces. As expected, the positive coefficient on the neighbor’s tax variable indicates provinces respond by changing around 0.73% of GDP to changes in neighboring jurisdictions of 1%.

Keywords: Strategic interaction; average effective corporate tax; panel data; spatial regression model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 H25 H77 R12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2014-01-01, Revised 2015-10-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://58.210.89.21/RePEc/xjt/working-papers/RIEI-WP_2014-01.pdf Revised version, 2015 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:xjt:rieiwp:2014-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in RIEI Working Papers from Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Research Institute for Economic Integration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paulo Regis ().