Comparison of Recent Toll Road Concession Transactions in the United States and France
Germà Bel () and
John Foote ()
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John Foote: Harvard University
No XREAP2007-11, Working Papers from Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP)
Recent concessions in France and in the US have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was twelve times current cash flow whereas investors paid sixty times current cash flow for the U.S. toll roads. In this paper we explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and what are the implications with respect to the public interest. Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.
Keywords: Transport infrastructures; roads; privatization; regulation and tolls. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L43 L92 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
Date: 2007-09, Revised 2007-11
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http://www.xreap.cat/RePEc/xrp/pdf/XREAP2007-11.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)
http://www.xreap.cat/RePEc/xrp/pdf/XREAP2007-11.pdf Revised version, 2007 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:xrp:wpaper:xreap2007-11
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