Reinforcement, repeated games, and local interaction

Oliver Kirchkamp and Rosemarie Nagel

No 02-17, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: We investigate and compare different approaches to derive strategies from laboratory data in prisoners' dilemmas experiments. While theory suggests more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones, we find in our experiments either the opposite or no difference. In this paper we investigate to which degree learning and reinforcement explains this dependence on structure and information. Starting from a very simple model we gradually develop a setup where players use repeated game strategies and choose among these strategies using a simple reinforcement rule. We then measure to which degree this model explain players' behaviour.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2002-02-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: We would like to express our thanks to the German DFG (through SFB 303 and SFB 504) and the Spanish DGIC Tècnica PB98-1076 for supporting the project. Main ideas for this paperw here conceived while the first author stayed at the Universität Bielefeld
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Working Paper: Reinforcement, repeated games, and local interaction (2002)
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