Disclosure Regimes and Corporate Governance

Jens Wüstemann (wuestemann@bwl.uni-mannheim.de)
Additional contact information
Jens Wüstemann: Lehrstuhl für ABWL und Wirtschaftsprüfung/Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Postal: L 13, 15, D-68131 Mannheim

No 04-11, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: As there is a strong relationship of disclosure regimes and corporate governance the internationally varying distribution of information rights can be interpreted as a function of different systems of corporate governance. A disclosure system comprises all legally recognized information claims that a system of corporate governance or a financial system furnishes financial contracting parties with: Both public disclosure and disclosure via private information channels may serve value-relevant information for suppliers of finance. An analysis within the framework of the New Institutional Economics brings about two findings: First, looking at the distribution of informational rights from a contractual perspective shows that the nexus of information rights formed by accounting and disclosure regulation and the distribution of power in the firm are mutually determining. For example, the main financing parties in Germany, banks and blockholders, have fairly good access to information via institutionalized internal information channels. Secondly, internationally accepted sets of accounting standards may improve the monitoring by markets. Nevertheless, accounting and disclosure regulation sometimes resemble a cookbook and should be transformed in a more principle-based and deductive system. Furthermore the whole institutional design of corporate governance should be based on realistic assumptions about human decision making to serve the intended purposes.

Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2004-04-07
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/publications/dp04-11.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de:80 (nodename nor servname provided, or not known)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:04-11

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
office@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim Contact information at EDIRC., Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carsten Schmidt (none@repec.org this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).