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Myopically Forward-Looking Agents in a Network Formation Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Siegfried K. Berninghaus (), Karl-Martin Ehrhart () and Marion Ott
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Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Universität Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Karl-Martin Ehrhart: Universitaet Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe

No 08-02, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: A population of players is considered in which each agent can select her neighbors in order to play a 2x2 Hawk-Dove game with each of them. We design our experiment in continuous time where participants may change their Hawk-Dove action and/or their neighborhood at any point in time. We are interested in the resulting formation of networks and the action distributions. Compared with static Nash equilibrium (e.g., Berninghaus and Vogt, 2004, 2006; Bramoulle, Lopez-Pintado, Goyal, and Vega-Redondo, 2004) and social optimum as theoretical benchmark solutions, subjects seem to employ a more complex, forward-looking thinking. We develop an other benchmark solution, called one-step-ahead stability, that combines forward-looking belief formation with rational response and that fits the data much better.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-01-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-upt
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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