Coordination and local interaction: Experimental evidence
Claudia Keser (keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de),
Karl-Martin Ehrhart (ehrhart@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de) and
Siegfried K. Berninghaus (sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de)
Additional contact information
Claudia Keser: Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Postal: Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe
Karl-Martin Ehrhart: Universitaet Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Universität Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
No 97-16, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim
Abstract:
Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1997-06-01
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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