Coordination Games: Recent Experimental Results

Siegfried K. Berninghaus (sbe@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de), Karl-Martin Ehrhart (ehrhart@wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de) and Claudia Keser (keser@vwl3.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de)
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Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Universität Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Karl-Martin Ehrhart: Universitaet Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Claudia Keser: Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Postal: Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe

No 97-29, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the local interaction structure imposed on the population of players.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1997-09-16
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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