Hindsight-Bias im Prinzipal-Agent-Kontext: Die Aktennotiz als Antwort?

Martin Weber and Lukas Mangelsdorff
Additional contact information
Lukas Mangelsdorff: Privatier, Postal: Feldstr. 91

No 98-03, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: In a principle agent relation, the principle might be enclined to controll the agent`s choice after the result of the choice has turned out to be unsatisfactory. Such a controll requires the priciple to reconsider the original choice problem the agent faced. We know from literature from social psychology that the hindsight bias disturbes the recollection of of ex ante probability judgements towards the true outcome. In our paper we study the implication of the hindsight bias for the principle agent relation. In case the agent anticipates the principle`s hindsight bias, she might be choose suboptimal alternatives. We discuss if writing a memo can help to cope with the bias.

Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1998-01-28
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:98-03

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim Contact information at EDIRC., Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carsten Schmidt ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).