Bidding Against an Unknown Number of Competitors With Affiliated Information

Jan Vleugels ()
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Jan Vleugels: University Mannheim, Postal: Building A5, Postbox 103 462, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany

No 99-84, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: This paper analyzes equilibrium bidding with a stochastic number of bidders in the general symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber. The equilibrium strategies for standard auctions generalize the known bid functions in a coherent way, but they cannot generally be explained by an averaging procedure of the fixed-n bids. Nevertheless, the linkage principle extends, and the well-known revenue ranking theorems generalize to a stochastic number of bidders. Applications include the comparative statics of the bidding schedules, settings with an unbounded pool of potential competitors, as well as environments with endogenous bidder entry.

Pages: 63 pages
Date: 1999-10-16
Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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