OPTIMALITY AND THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION WITH RESALE

Bernard Lebrun ()

Discussion Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: If the value cumulative distribution functions are log-concave at the highest lower extremity of their supports of the first-price auction in the asymmetric indepent private values model.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2004-05, Revised 2004-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:dpaper:2004_03

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