Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies

Derek Pyne

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper attempts to explain how lobbying expenditures can influence the outcome of an election fought over trade policy. Voters are assumed to own both capital and labour. The expenditures of lobby groups act as a signal to voters of the difference in returns to their factor endowments under different political parties.

Pages: 31 pages
Date: 1997-07
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http://dept.econ.yorku.ca/pub/working_papers/97-03.pdf First version, 1997
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Related works:
Journal Article: Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion: Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yca:wpaper:1997_03

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