Price Discrimination and Social Welfare with Demand Uncertainty

Mahmudul Anam () and Shin-Hwan Chiangy ()
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Shin-Hwan Chiangy: York University, Canada

Working Papers from York University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Price, output and welfare erects of third-degree price discrimination is analyzed in the context of a risk-averse monopolist, who commits to xed prices before the revelation of random and potentially correlated demands. Assuming the disturbance term to be additive, white noise and the monopolist to have a quadratic (mean-variance) utility function, we show that price discrimination may occur with identical expected demands, the relatively risky but price insensitive market may be charged the lower price and despite linear demands, aggregate expected output may fall while social welfare rises. All of these results, which run counter to those in the deterministic model, are shown to be driven by the asymmetry in the revenue and risk characteristics of the markets and the willingness of the monopolist to trade increased level for reduced risk of expected prot in a manner similar to portfolio choice with risky and correlated assets. Key Words: Monopoly (D42), Monopolization Strategies (L12), Decision Making under Risk and Uncertainty (D81)

JEL-codes: D42 D81 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 1999-09
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